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Since Hart(1975) pointed out that an equilibrium allocation with incomplete
markets needs not be Pareto efficient, many authors have discussed the issue of
inefficiency of equilibria with incomplete markets from various points of view.
In all those works, however, incomplete asset markets to bc consid[\[.r,d are cx-
clusively limited to the real asset markets. In this paper, we consider efficiency of
equilibrium allocations $\dot{|}\mathrm{n}$ the incomplete markets model with nominal assets and a
single consumption good.
As aresult, we show Pareto inefficiency of equilibrium allocations generically
both in all agents’ utility functions without any convexity and their endowments.
1Introduction
Since Hart[12] pointed out that an equilibrium allocation with incomplete markets
needs not be Pareto efficient, many authors have discussed the issue of inefficiency of
equilibria with incomplete markets from various points of view. To mention afew,
Grossman[10], Diamond[5], Stiglitz[15], Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis[9], Geanakop
$1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}$ , Magill, Quinzii and Dr\‘eze[7], Werner[19], Kajii[13], Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci[4],
Magill and Quinzii[14] and so on.
In those works, however, incomplete asset markets to be considered are exclusively
restricted to the real asset markets. As is well known, the assets are conceptually clas-
sified into two groups, that is, real assets and nominal assets. It is noteworthy about
these two kinds of assets that the structure of the set of equilibrium allocations is very
different among them. In areal asset model the equilibrium set is shown to bc generically
finite(Duffie and Shafer[6]) whereas in anominal asset model there generically exists real
indeterminacy of equilibria, which means that the set of equilibrium allocations consti-
tutes acontinuum(Cass[2][3], Werner[18]).
In this paper, we consider efficiency of equilibrium allocations in the incomplete markets
model with nominal assets and asingle consumption good. We investigate this issue from
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agenericity viewpoint with respect to all agents’ convexity-free utility functions and their
endowments. In contrast to areal asset model with asingle consumption good, in a
nominal asset model the spot prices to be necessarily considered form an obstacle to our
efficiency argument. To cope with this difficulty, we can make use of Thorn transversality
theorem in 1-jet space and the concept of fibration so as to deduce some significant
consequences about efficiency of the equilibrium allocations with incomplete nominal
asset markets.
In section 2we describe the model to be considered. In section 3, by using the idea
of fibration and applying Thorn Transversality Theorem in 1 -jet space, we obtain
two outcomes about efficiency of equilibrium allocations in anominal asset model. One
concerns generic inefficiency of the equilibrium allocations. The other one centers on the
cause of inefficiency. In the final section we address the relation between our result and
the property of the nominal asset prices (endogenous or exogenous).
2The Model
We consider efficiency of equilibria in an exchange economy model in which there are
two periods, with uncertainty in the second, and there exist nominal assets and asingle
consumption good. First and second period is each specified by $t=0$ and 1. At date 1
one of $S$ states(s $=1$ , $\cdots$ , $S$) occurs. We call date $t=0$, state $s$ $=0$ so that there are
$S+1$ states in all. There exist I consumers(i $=1$ , $\cdots$ , $I$). The commodity space for each
agent is $R^{S+1}$ because of asingle consumption good. Each agent $i$ is characterized by
its consumption set $X^{i}$ , its utility function $u^{i}$ and its initial endowments $\omega^{i}$ . We make
assumptions on those factors as follows. For each $i$ $(i=1, \cdots, I)$ ,
Assumption 1 $X^{i}$ is $R_{++}^{S+1}$ .
Assumption 2 $u^{i}$ satisfies
1. $u^{*}$
.
$\in C^{\infty}(R_{++}^{S+1}, R)$ .
2. $du_{X}^{i}\in R_{++}^{S+1}$ for each $x$ $\in R_{++}^{S+1}$ .
Assumption 3 $\omega^{i}\in R_{++}^{S+1}$ .
Note that no convexity is assumed on the utility function. For simplicity, let $u=$
$(u^{1}, \cdots,u^{I})$ and $\omega$ $=(\omega^{1}, \cdots,\omega^{I})$ in the following. There are $J$ nominal assets $(j=$
$1$ , $\cdots$ , $J)$ in the economy. Our interest is in the case of incomplete asset markets so that
$J<S$ . Each nominal asset $j$ can be purchased for the price $q_{j}$ at date 0and promises to
deliver agiven stream of units of account $v^{j}=$ $(v_{1}^{j}, \cdots, v_{S}^{j})$ across the states at date 1.
If we see $v^{j}(j=1, \cdots,J)$ as acolumn vector and put them together, then we obtain an
$S\mathrm{x}J$ matrix of returns $V=[v^{1}, \cdots,v^{J}]$ . We can assume that rank $V=J$ without loss
of generality. Let $p^{\mathrm{g}}$ be aspot price of the good in state $s$ $(s=0,1, \cdots, S)$ . We make the
following assumptions on the asset prices and spot prices of the good
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Assumption 4 p $\in R_{++}^{S+1}$ , q $\in R_{++}^{J}$
where p $=$ $(p^{0}, p^{1}, \cdots,p^{S})$ and q $=(q_{1},$\cdots , qJ).
Given the asset structure $V$ , each agent has achance to purchase some amounts of $J$ assets
and adjust his income stream so that he can optimize his intertemporal consumptions.
Let $z^{i}=$ $(z_{1}^{i}, \cdots, z_{J}\dot{.})\in R^{J}$ denote the number of units of the $J$ assets purchased by






$=\omega_{0}^{j}-q\cdot z^{i}$ , $z^{i}\in R^{J}$ ...... $(*)$
$p^{s}x_{\theta}. \cdot=\sum_{j-1}^{J}v_{\iota}^{\mathrm{j}}zj$ $+p^{s}\omega_{\theta}^{*}$ , $s$ $=1$ , $\cdots$ , $S$.
Note that there is only one good in the economy so that the good at date 0is interpreted
as anumeraire (i.e. $p^{0}=1$ ).
Now an economy with nominal assets is specified by all agents’s utility functions and
endowments as well as asset structure $V$ . So let $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega;V)$ denote the economy composed
of $u$ , $\omega$ and $V$ . Then the equilibrium of the economy $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega;V)$ is defined as follows.
Definition 1An asset market equilibrium for $\mathcal{E}(u, \omega;V)$ is a tuple $((xz^{\dot{*}}):,:, p1, q)$
such that
(i) $(ox^{:}, z^{:})$ is a solution of the problem $(*)$ . $i=1$ , $\cdots$ , $I$ .
$( \mathrm{i}\mathrm{i})\sum_{i=1}^{I}x=\sum_{j=1}^{I}:\omega^{i}$
$( \dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{i})\sum_{i=1}^{I}z^{i}=0$
where $P1=$ $(p^{1}, \cdots, p^{S})$ .
Next we consider efficiency of allocations. Given u and $\omega$ , aPareto optimal allocation is
defined as follows.
Definition 2An allocation $x=(\overline{x}^{1}, \cdots,\overline{ox}^{I})\in R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ is a Pareto optimum if
(i) $\sum_{i=1}^{I}\overline{x}^{j}=\sum_{\dot{|}=1}^{I}\omega^{*}$
.
(ii) there does not exist x $=(x^{1},$\cdots ,$x^{I})\in R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ such that $\sum_{j=1}^{I}ax^{i}=\sum_{=1}^{I}\omega^{i}$ and
$u^{i}(x^{i})\geq u^{i}(\overline{x}^{j}),i=1$ , \cdots , I with a strict inequality for at least one i.
Lastly we define aparticular feasibility for the economy $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega;$ V).
Definition 3For any given strictly positive $S$ -vector $\lambda$($=(\lambda_{1}$ , $\cdots$ , A5)), an allocation
$x=$ $(x^{1}, \cdots, x^{I})\in R^{(S+1)I}$ is pseudO-X-feasible if
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(i) $\sum_{i=1}^{I}x^{i}=\sum_{i=1}^{I}\omega^{i}$
(ii) $oe_{1}\in\langle\Lambda V\rangle+\omega_{1}^{i}$ , $i=1$ , $\cdots$ , $I$
where Ais a $S\cross S$ diagonal matrix with Afor its diagonal and $\langle\Lambda V\rangle$ indicates a vector
subspace spanned by the colrrrnns of a $S\cross J$ matrix $\Lambda V$ whereas $x_{1}^{i}$ and $\omega_{1}^{\mathrm{i}}$ denote
$(x_{1}^{j}, \cdots, x_{S}^{i})$ and $(\omega_{1}^{i}, \cdots,\omega_{\mathrm{S}}^{i})$ respectively.
Let $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ denote the set of pseud0-A-feasible allocations with respect to $\omega$ . Indeed only
the intersection of $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ and $R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ makes sense, but we will use the whole set of $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$
for the analytical purpose in the following. If atuple $((x^{i}, z^{i})_{i},p1$ , $q)$ is an asset market
equilibrium for $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega;V)$ , then obviously $(x^{\dot{1}})\dot{.}$ is an element of $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ .
In the following we investigate efficiency of asset market equilibria from agenericity
viewpoint with regard to $u$ and $\omega$ . To this end, we need to specify the set of admissible
$u$ and $\omega$ .
With respect to $\omega$ , each $\omega^{i}$ is restricted to $R_{++}^{S+1}$ which is an open subset of atopological
space $R^{S+1}$ with the ordinary Euclidean topology, so that the set of admissible $\omega$ is
$R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ which is naturally interpreted as an open subset of aproduct topological space
$R^{(S+1)I}$ . On the other hand, an utility function of each agent is required to belong to
the subset of $C^{\infty}(R_{++}^{S+1}, R)$ . Let $U$ denote the subset. Given the Whitney $C^{\infty}$ topology
to $C^{\infty}(R_{++}^{S+1}, R)$ , then $U$ has adefinite structure.
Proposition 1 $U$ is an open subset of $C^{\infty}(R_{++}^{S+1}, R)$ in the Whitney $C^{\infty}$ topology.
Proof: See proof of Proposition B in Nagatafl 7f.
Let the I product of $U$ be $\mathcal{U}$ , which is obviously the admissible set of $u$ . Then it
follows from the above proposition that $\mathcal{U}$ is an open subset of aproduct topological
space $C^{\infty}(R_{++}^{S+1}, R)^{I}$ Thus the whole set of admissible $u$ and $\omega$ is $\mathcal{U}\cross R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ which
is called the economy space.
3Main Result
It has been shown that the structure of the set of equilibrium allocations is quite
different between anominal asset model and real asset one when markets are incomplete.
In the real asset case generically the set of equilibrium allocations is finite whereas the
set in the nominal asset case generically expands and has partly the structure of a $S-1$
or $S-J$ dimensional manifold, depending on if the nominal asset prices are taken to be
endogenous or exogenous. It is true that Pareto inefficiency of equilibrium allocations is
generically obtained in the real asset case (see Magill and Quinzii[14], Nagata[17]), but
we can not determine immediately whether the consequence carries over to the nominal
asset case or not since the set of equilibrium allocations becomes drastically large in the
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latter case. To investigate this issue we first consider an auxiliary set $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ is substituted
for the set of equilibrium allocations in our nominal asset model.
Proposition 2For any equilibrium $((\overline{x}^{i},\overline{z}^{i})_{i},\overline{p}_{1},\overline{q})$ for $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega;V)$ , there exists a vec-
$tor\overline{\lambda}$ of $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ such that the equilibrium allocation $(\overline{x}^{i})_{i}$ is pseudO-X-feasible where $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$
designates the strictly positive $S-1$ dimensinal simplex $in$ $R^{S}$ .
Proof: It is sufficient to show that $(\overline{x}^{i})_{i}$ satisfies that $\sum_{\dot{|}=1}^{I}\overline{x}^{i}=\sum_{i=1}^{I}\omega^{i}$ and $\overline{ox}^{i}1\in$
$\langle\overline{\Lambda}V\rangle+\omega_{1}^{i}$ , $i=1$ , $\cdots$ , I. Set $c= \sum_{s=1}^{S}\frac{1}{\overline{p}}.,\tilde{z}^{i}=\frac{1}{c}\overline{z}^{i}$ , $i=1$ , $\cdots$ , $I_{f} \tilde{p}1=(\frac{1}{\overline{p}^{1}}, \cdots, \overline{\overline{p}}^{T}1)$ and
$\tilde{q}=c\overline{q}$ . Then it is easily seen that $((\overline{oe}\tilde{z}^{i})_{i}:,,\tilde{p}_{1},\tilde{q})$ is also an equilibrium for the economy.
Now we set $\overline{\lambda}=c(\frac{1}{\overline{p}^{1}}, \cdots,\frac{1}{\overline{P}^{S}})$ which is obviously an element of $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ . Considerring
the property of the ne$w$ equilibrium, the following equations hold. $\sum_{\mathrm{i}=1}^{I}\overline{x}^{\dot{1}}$ $= \sum_{i=1}^{I}\omega^{i}$ ,
$\overline{x}_{1}^{*}=\overline{\Lambda}V\cdot\tilde{z}^{i}$ % $\omega_{1}^{i}$ , $i=1$ , $\cdots$ , $I$ .
It is obvious from the above proposition that all the equilibrium allocations for $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega;V)$
are included in the union of $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ over $\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-1}(\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.\bigcup_{\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-1}}F_{\lambda}(\omega))$ . We will make
use of this union instead of the set of equilibrium allocations itself in the following.
Each factor of the union (i.e. $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ ) has adefinite structure with the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 5 $(J+1)I>S+1$
Lemma 1Under assumption 5, for any Ain $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ and any $\omega$ in $R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ , $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$
constitutes a $(J+1)I-(S+1)$ dimensional linear submanifold in $R^{(S+1)I}$ .
Proof: For any Ain $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ , obviously the $S\cross S$ matrix Ais nonsingular so that rank
$\Lambda V=J$ by the assumption that rank $V=J$ . Thus we can apply the way of proving in
proof of proposition 5in Nagata[J7] to have the desired result.
The union $\bigcup_{\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-\iota}}F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ itself is not tractable for agenericity analysis since it is not
necessarily amanifold. Therefore, we are going to process this set so that we can facilitate
our genericity analysis.
Let $e$ be aunit $S$-vector(i.e. $\mathrm{e}=(1,$ $\cdots$ , 1)) and consider the pseud0-e-feasible set $F_{\mathrm{e}}(\omega)$
which is obviously an $(J+1)I-(S+1)$ dimensional linear submanifold in $R^{(S+1)I}$ . Note
that for any Ain $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ , $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ and $F_{\mathrm{e}}(\omega)$ are diffeomorphic. In addition, considering
the specifying conditions of those sets, there exists asmooth map $G:F_{\mathrm{e}}(\omega)\cross\Delta^{S-1}++arrow$
$R^{(S+1)I}$ such that $G(\cdot, \lambda)$ : $F_{\mathrm{e}}(\omega)arrow R^{(S+1)I}$ i $\mathrm{s}$ ainto.–diffeomorphism and $G(F_{\epsilon}(\omega), \lambda)=$
$F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ for any Ain $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ . Now Let $F(\omega)$ be the disjoint union of $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ , $\lambda\in\Delta^{S1}+\overline{+}$ . Then,
by using the idea of fibration, we can make it amanifold.




We shall now turn to the characterization of efficiency of allocations. To this end, we
consider the first order necessary conditions for Pareto optimal allocations. Considering
assumption 2, it is easily shown that if an allocation $\overline{x}=$ $(\overline{ox}^{1}, \cdots,\overline{x}^{I})\in R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ is Pareto
optimal, then the following equation holds.
$du_{\overline{l}^{1}}^{1}/ \sum_{s=0}^{S+1}du_{s,\overline{X}^{1}}^{1}=\cdots=du_{ax^{I}}^{\underline{I}}/\sum_{s=0}^{S+1}du_{\epsilon,\overline{X}^{t}}^{I}$
Let $A(u)$ be the set of allocations which satisfy the above condition for any given $u$ .
Note that no feasibility is required to $A(u)$ . With regard to the property of $A(u)$ , the
following proposition is obtained by altering Thorn Transversality Theorem to aproduct
functional form and using it in 1-jet space.
Proposition 4There exists a dense subset $\mathcal{U}^{*}$ of $\mathcal{U}$ such that for any $u$ in $\mathcal{U}^{*}$ , $A(u)$
constitutes an $S+I$ dimensional submanifold in $R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ .
Proof: See proof of Proposition 4in Nagata[l 7f.
Finally we consider the relation between $A(u)$ and $\bigcup_{\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-1}}F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ . In order to obtain
afruitful consequence, we need some device. First fix an $A(u)$ for any given $u$ of $\mathcal{U}^{*}$
and consider the inclusion map $\iota$ : $A(u)arrow R^{(S+1)I}$ . Then the image of $\iota$ , i.e. $A(u)$ ,
can be seen as a $(S+I)$ dimensional submanifold of $R^{(S+1)I}$ . Next, pick an arbitrary $\omega$
out of $R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ and define the following set. $N_{1}^{+}(\omega)=\{y\in R_{++}^{(S+1)I}|||y-\omega||<1\}$ . By
using this set as aparameter space, we define the map $\psi:F(\omega)\mathrm{x}$ $N_{1}^{+}(\omega)arrow R^{(S+1)I}$ by
{ $(\mathrm{x},y)=x+y$ where $x’=\{(x, \lambda)|x\in \mathrm{A}(\mathrm{u}), \lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-1}\}$ .
Lemma 2 $\psi$ is a smooth map and a submersion.
Proof: See Appendix.
Then we claim the following.
Proposition 5For almost all $y\in N_{1}^{+}(\omega)_{f}\psi(\cdot, y)$ : $F(\omega)arrow R^{(S+1)I}$ is transversal to
$A(u)$ .
Proof: $\psi$ : $F(\omega)\mathrm{x}N_{1}^{+}(\omega)arrow R^{(S+1)I}$ is transversal to $A(u)$ since it is shown in the
above proposition to be a submersion. Thus, by applying The Transversality Theorem $($
see Guillemin and Pollack[l $l$], p.68) to $\psi$ , we obtain the desired result
$\psi$ has another remarkable property as follows.
Proposition 6For each $y\in N_{1}^{+}(\omega)$ , $\psi(F(\omega), y)=\bigcup_{\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-\iota}}F_{\lambda}(\omega+y)$ .
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Proof: Since $\mathrm{F}(\mathrm{u})$ is the disjoint union of $F_{\lambda}(\omega),\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ , obtaining its image by
$\psi(\cdot, y)$ requires us to consider all the $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$ with regard to $\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ . Recall that $F_{\lambda}(\omega)$
is the set of $x(= (x^{1}, \cdots, x^{I})\in R^{(S+1\rangle I})$ which satisfies (1) $\sum_{i=1}^{I}x^{i}=\sum_{i=1}^{I}\omega^{i}$ and (2)
$x_{1}^{i}\in\langle\Lambda V\rangle+\omega_{\dot{1}}$
.
’ $i=1$ , $\cdots$ , I. Thus for any $\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ and $y\in N_{1}^{+}(\omega)$ the set $\{(x+y)\in$
$R^{(S+1)I}|x\in F_{\lambda}(\omega)\}$ is obviously equal to the set $\{x\in R^{(S+1)I}|x\in F_{\lambda}(\omega+y)\}$ . Since
$\psi(\cdot, y)$ substantially transfo$rms$ any $x$ into $xf$ $y$ , our $c/atm$ immediately follows.
To obtain our final consequences, we need another assumption on the numbers of
agents, assets and states.
Assumption 6 S $>J+1$ , I $>J$
Note that this assumption is not required in the case of real asset economy(see Nagata[17])
although the assumption itself is not so harmful.
Now we are in aposition to state our main results.
Theorem 1Under assumptions $\mathit{1}\sim\theta$, for almost all $u$ and $\omega$ , each equilibrium allO-
cation of the economy $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega;V)$ with nominal assets is Pareto inefficient.
Proof: Let $u$ and $\omega$ be respectively arbitrary elements of $\mathcal{U}^{*}$ and $R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ . Let $y$ be an
element of $N_{1}^{+}(\omega)$ such that $\psi(\cdot, y)$ is transversal to $A(u)$ . Note that from proposition 5
such an $y$ is an element of a dense set of $N_{1}^{+}(\omega)$ . Now suppose that $\psi(F(\omega), y)\cap A(u)\neq\emptyset$ .
Then for any $x$ $\in\psi(F(\omega),y)\cap A(u)$ , we have
$d\psi_{z^{\mathrm{r}}}(T_{z}*(F(\omega))+T_{x}(A(u))=R^{(S+1)I}$
where $T$ designates a tangent space and $z^{*}$ is an element of $\psi^{-1}(\cdot$ , $y)(x)$ . However, by
proposition $S$ and 4and assumption 6we have the following inequality.





which is a contradiction to the previous equation. Thus $\psi(F(\omega),y)\cap A(u)=\emptyset$, which im-
plies that $\bigcup_{\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{S-\iota F_{\lambda}(\omega+y)\cap A(u)=\emptyset}}$ by proposition 6. Noting that $\bigcup_{\lambda\in\Delta_{++}^{\mathrm{S}-1}}F_{\lambda}(\omega+y)$
includes the whole set of equilibrium allocations for $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega+y;V)$ and that an equilib-
riurn allocation can not be Pareto efficient unless it belongs to $A(u)$ , it turns out that any
equilibrium allocation for $\mathcal{E}(u,\omega+y;V)$ is Pareto inefficient. Since $\omega$ is arbitrarily taken
frorn $R_{++}^{(S+1)I}$ and $u$ and $y$ are respectively arbitrary elements of the dense sets, our clai
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4Concluding Remarks
We have investigated generic inefficiency of equilibrium allocations with incomplete
markets of nominal assets with respect to all agents’ utility functions (u) and endowments
(w) in the one good-two period exchange economy model. The admissible sets of $u$ and
$\omega$ considered here are the same as the ones in areal asset model considered before(See
Nagata[17] $)$ . As aresult, we have obtained similar results to the ones in the real asset
model at the cost of an additional assumption on the numbers of agents, assets and
states(See assumption 6). The reason why the additional assumption is required is that
anominal asset model generically yields much larger set of equilibrium allocations than
areal asset model. More specifically, the fact that the dimension of the pseud0-feasible
set which includes all the equilibrium allocations increases by $S-1$ in the nominal asset
case needs the additional assumption to ensure the invalidity of Pareto efficiency.
In this connection it is worthy to note the following point. In anominal asset model
the structure of the set of equilibrium allocations is different between endogenous asset
prices and exogenous asset prices. That is to say, genericaly the set consists partly of a
$S-1$ dimensinal manifold in the former case(Geanakoplos and Mas-c0le11[8]) whereas it
partly constitutes an $S-J$ dimensinal manifold in the latter case(Balasko and Cass[l]).
The difference, however, does not make any change in our results. Our results hold
in both cases because the pseud0-feasible set which is combined with $A(u)$ to prove
the impossibility of Pareto efficiency includes any equilibrium allocation regardless of
whether it is based on endogenous asset prices or exogenous asset prices. Indeed, the
pseudcyfeasible set is derived from all agents’ budget constraints of each state at date 1
which are specified independently of asset prices(See definition 3). Obviously, the asset
prices have something to do only with every agent’s budget constraint at date 0.
Appendix (1) Proof of proposition 3.
We are going to give asmooth manifold structure as well as atopological structure to
$F(\omega)$ in such away that it becomes atotal space on $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ as base space. Let $\pi$ : $F(\omega)arrow$
$\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ be aprojection defined by $\pi(x^{*})=\lambda$ where $x^{*}=(x, \lambda|x\in F_{\lambda}(\omega),$ $\lambda\in\Delta^{S1})+\overline{+}$ . Let
$\{(U_{\alpha}, \varphi_{\alpha})\}_{\alpha\in A}$ be the atlas of $\Delta_{++}^{S-1}$ . Consider $\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha})$ for any chart $\varphi_{\alpha}$ : $U_{\alpha}arrow R^{S-1}$
and difine the map $\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha}$ : $\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha})arrow R^{(J+1)I-(S+1)}\mathrm{x}R^{S-1}$ by
$\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha}(x^{ast})=(\phi_{\beta}\mathrm{o}G^{-1}(x, \lambda),$ $\varphi_{\alpha}(\lambda))$
where $\phi\rho$ is an appropriate chart $\phi\rho$ : $W_{\beta}arrow R^{(J+1)I-(S+1)}$ of the atlas $(W\beta, \phi\rho)_{\beta\in B}$
for the manifold $F_{\mathrm{e}}(\omega)$ . Let asubset $Z$ of $F_{\omega}$ be called an open set if for any $\alpha$ ,
$\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha}(Z\cap\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha}))$ is open in $R^{(J+1)I-(S+1)}\mathrm{x}$ $R^{S-1}$ . Then it is easily seen that those sets
constitutes asystem of open sets which gives atopological structure to $F_{\omega}$ .
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Next, consider the property of the collection ( $\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha)}\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha})_{\alpha\in A}$ . Suppose that for
$\alpha$ , $\alpha^{prime}\in A$ , $\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha})$ Cl $\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha^{\mathrm{p}_{T}me}}:)\neq\emptyset$ . Then for any point (a, b) of $\varphi\sim\alpha(\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha})\cap$
$\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha^{\mathrm{p}rim\mathrm{e}}}))$ we have
$\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha’}0\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha}^{-1}(a,b)$ $=$ $\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha’}((G(\phi_{\beta}^{-1}(a), \lambda))=(\phi_{\beta}\mathrm{o}G^{-1}(G(\phi_{\beta}^{-1}(a), \lambda),$ $\lambda),\varphi_{\alpha’}(\varphi_{\alpha}^{-1}(b)))$
$=$ $(a,\varphi_{\alpha’}0\varphi_{\alpha}^{-1}(b))$
where $\lambda=\varphi_{\alpha}^{-1}(b)$ . Thus $\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha’}0\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha}^{-1}$ : $\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha}(\mathrm{z}\mathrm{r}^{-1}(U_{\alpha})\cap\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha^{prim\mathrm{e}}}))arrow\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha’}(\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha})\cap$
$\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha’}))$ is adiffeomorphism. Since it is obvious that $\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha})_{\alpha\in A}$ covers $F(\omega)$ , which
implies that $F(\omega)$ is regarded as asmooth manifold the dimension of which is $(J+1)I-$
$(S+1)+(S-1)=(J+1)I-2$. Q.E.D.
(2) Proof of lemma 2.
It suffices for us to check the claim locally. Let $(\pi^{-1}(U_{\alpha},\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha})\mathrm{x}$ $(N_{1}^{+}(\omega), i))$ be achart
including any given point $(x^{*}, y)$ of $F(\omega)\mathrm{x}$ $N_{1}^{+}(\omega)$ where $i$ is the identity map. Let
$\tilde{\varphi}_{\alpha}(x^{*})=(a, b)$ where obviously $a\in R^{(J+1)I-(S+1)}$ and $b\in R^{S-1}$ . Then we have the
following local parameterization of $\psi$ at $(x^{*}, y)$ .
$G(\phi_{\beta}^{-1}(a), \varphi_{\alpha}^{-1}(b))+y$
which is obviously differentiable at $(a, b, y)$ since $G$ is asmooth map, thus $\psi$ is also differ-
ntiable at $(x^{*}, y)$ . In addition, it is obvious from the form of the local parameterization
that $\psi$ is asubmersion. Q.E.D.
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